7kontinent

I jos mozes, u stvari. Make Banat proud. Covek cak i lici na tebe. Ako zagusti smesticemo te na Ukrajinu - no heat and a lot of tail there. So we have that end covered!

Inace, apsolutno je skandalno da su coveku dali novac da se kocka, pa ga onda tuzili zato sto je izgubio.


http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101005/ap_on_bi_ge/eu_france_trader_on_trial

PARIS – Ex-trader Jerome Kerviel was convicted on all counts Tuesday in history's biggest rogue trading scandal, sentenced to three years in jail and ordered to pay his former employer a mind-numbing euro4.9 billion ($6.7 billion) in damages.

The ruling marked a huge victory for Societe Generale SA, one of France's most blue-blooded banks, which has worked to clean up its image and put in place tougher risk controls since the scandal broke in 2008.

The 33-year-old former futures index trader stood expressionless as the court convicted him and pronounced a five-year sentence with two years suspended. Kerviel was found guilty on charges of forgery, breach of trust and unauthorized computer use for covering up bets worth nearly euro50 billion between late 2007 and early 2008.

In the most stunning blow, the court ordered Kerviel to pay the bank back the euro4.9 billion that it lost unwinding his complex positions in January 2008 — a punishment he would almost certainly be unable to pay. He was also banned for life from working in the financial industry.

There were gasps and surprised looks when presiding judge Dominique Pauthe read out the damages to a packed courtroom.

Outside the courtroom, defense lawyer Olivier Metzner called the financial penalty "unbelievable."

"I have the feeling Jerome Kerviel is paying for an entire system," said Metzner, noting that his client hadn't benefited financially from the fraud.

Metzner said Kerviel would appeal and will remain free pending that appeal. The damages are also suspended during the appeals process.

French media calculated that — based on his current salary of euro2,300 ($3,150) a month as a computer consultant — it would take Kerviel 177,536 years to pay off the damages.

Click image to see photos of Jerome Kerviel


AFP/Joel Saget

Paris lawyer Emmanuelle Kneuse, who works on white-collar crime cases, said the damages were the largest she could recall in France, a sum that obviously Kerviel could never pay in full.

But if the prison sentence and the huge damages are maintained on appeal, that would likely force Kerviel to promise substantial monthly payments to secure his release on parole, she said.

While trading for the bank, Kerviel took home a salary and bonus of less than euro100,000, or about $155,700 — a relatively modest sum in the financial world.

Societe Generale spokeswoman Caroline Guillaumin called the verdict "an important ruling that acknowledges the moral and financial harm done to the bank and its staff."

"The bank can now turn the page, pursue its strategy and continue to rebound," Guillaumin said in an e-mailed statement.

Kerviel sat with his arms folded and his legs crossed during the first 45 minutes of the hour-long hearing, alone in the front row of the courtroom. He barely blinked as each guilty verdict was read out. He then stood for sentencing in a dark suit and tie, frowning and silent.

"He is disgusted," Metzner said of Kerviel's reaction to the ruling, adding the court had judged the bank "was responsible for nothing, not responsible for the creature that it had created."

"I hope you all will donate a euro to Jerome Kerviel," the lawyer told TV cameras and reporters.

Kerviel, a soft-spoken and debonair man from western Brittany, has garnered considerable public appeal in France for his image of being a scapegoat for powerful corporate interests. Kerviel maintained that the bank and his bosses tolerated his massive risk-taking as long as it made money, which he did at first, racking up euro1.4 billion in profits for Societe Generale in 2007, the judge noted.

In the end, the bank's loss of euro4.9 billion stands as the largest-ever alleged fraud by a single trader, though the case has since been overshadowed by other crises in the financial world, from the fall of Lehman Brothers to Bernard L. Madoff's multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme.

During the proceedings, both sides admitted to mistakes but Kerviel insisted his bank superiors knew what he was doing. Societe Generale's former chairman acknowledged there were problems in monitoring the trader's work, and an internal report by the bank found managers failed to follow up on 74 different alarms about Kerviel's activities.

The bank says Kerviel made bets of up to euro50 billion — more than the bank's total market value — on futures contracts on three European equity indices, and that he masked the size of his bets by recording fictitious offsetting transactions.

In the ruling, the court said Kerviel acted without the bank's knowledge and said it was "obvious" none of his bosses would have allowed him to bet sums exceeding the bank's capital.

"Through his deliberate actions, he endangered the solvency of a bank that employed 140,000 people including himself, and whose future was seriously put at risk," the ruling said.

The court also praised the bank's handling of the crisis, saying Kerviel's "actions without a doubt threatened the public order of the world economy" though their "impact was contained in the end by the bank's reactivity."

No one else faces charges in the case. The bank's CEO Daniel Bouton and its head of investment banking Jean-Pierre Mustier stepped down in the wake of the scandal, with Bouton saying attacks on him risked hurting the bank.

The bank's earnings crumpled in 2007 after taking into account the losses on Kerviel's trades. Its profit rebounded in 2008 but were cut by more than half last year when the bank was hit by billions in new losses stemming from bad bets prior to the financial crisis. This year the bank's earnings have bounced back, thanks to strong retail banking in its home market.

Employed by Societe Generale since 2000, Kerviel worked his way up from a supporting role in an office that monitors trades to a job on the futures desk where he invested the bank's money by hedging on European equity market indices.

He was arrested in January 2008 and held for six weeks in Paris' La Sante prison.

Societe Generale's shares rose after the announcement of the verdict, trading up 3 percent at euro42.05 ($57.94).

Kerviel's fraud eclipsed that of previous lone traders.

In one infamous case, Nick Leeson, a British trader working in Singapore for Barings Bank, made unauthorized futures trades that lost more than $1 billion and led to the venerable bank's collapse in 1995. That case prompted banks worldwide to tighten their internal checks.

Leeson was released from a Singapore jail in 1998 for good behavior after serving 3 1/2 years of a 6 1/2-year sentence. He claimed he did not make a cent from his disastrous trades but is still subject to an injunction from the liquidators of Barings that seeks the return of 100 million pounds on any of his earnings that relate to Barings.

In 2008, Leeson said he'd paid back less than 500,000 pounds. He used the profits from the book "Rogue Trader" to pay off his seven-figure legal bill.

Leeson's agent said Tuesday the former trader was willing to do an exclusive interview on the Kerviel verdict — in exchange for a fee.

___

Associated Press writers Pierre-Antoine Souchard, Cecile Brisson and Angela Doland in Paris and Jane Wardell in London contributed to this report.

Magna negligentia culpa est; magna culpa dolus est.

Btw, ako se secas, na Acetovom 7k-u opisivao sam malo tu banku (tj. njen investment banking/fixed-income & money market trading biznis ovde u NYC ali i pupcanu vrpcu sa Parizom i celu tu "evil, elitist big city people"  :mrgreen: kulturu). Missim...

hatemi prodaje hotdogs na tzv. wallstreet-u. kakve veze ima on sa trading stocks?!   :idea:

a i da kojim slicajem pocne da trade-uje jos uvijek bi biJo milIjun godina daleko i od najmanjih odluka, a da ne govorimo o tim genijalnim prevarantima tipa bernie madoff.

S' 600 metara, u oko, iz prve, po pare?

nemo' da se izmotavas druze... trade-ujes li stocks ili ne?!    :lol:

p.s. privatno trade-ovanje proslogodisnjeg bonusa od $500 se ne racuna of course.     :mrgreen:

Pazi stvarno ovaj isti nase krompirce  :shock:

"stock??? "stock"??? "stock"???

xrofl

I have some chicken stock in my fridge  if anyone needs some  xnerd

izbjegavas odgovor jer znas da ti niko ni 2 (dvije) nacrtane ovce na cuvanje ne bi povjerio... bilo akcije ili tzv. papire od "vrijednosti".    xjap

Drz' volan da se ne sataris negde.

hatemi, najvece vozilo ili plovilo kojim sam ikada upravljao je bio 27-foot stretch limo za neke tzv. VIP goste i preko sluzbe naravno...    :)

Ne sumnjam.

Quote from: Che on October 05, 2010, 09:42:13 PM
hatemi, najvece vozilo ili plovilo kojim sam ikada upravljao je bio 27-foot stretch limo za neke tzv. VIP goste i preko sluzbe naravno...    :)

Viktore ti si?

Nije, sad sam ga zvao. Valjda bi mi rek'o.

ekreme pa 'el nisi na farmi?

evo, ni ovaj drveni filoSof alan nije odolio da prestane da me navodno ignorise... dzaba se mucite kao gosti da citate prim. dr. che-Ja.    :mrgreen:

preskacem te kao govno na ulici.

how yes no...    :)

nego sisoje, ni ja ne ceznem da se druzim sa likovima kojima je dedin telefon sa brojem 9 (devet) i recept za sne-nokle najveci domet u zivotu.    :roll:

siroko ti polje.

ima li iko ovde da sa tobom uopste i prica? ono da te nesto pita, da ti ljudski kaze, da prodiskutujete nesto? 'el se ne osecas glupo da te svi u drustvu smatraju bolidom?
znas ono "if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck...it must be a duck".

sa tobom kao personom se ne bi promijenio ni u ludilu, jer si suntav, usukan, ulitan i nikakav. a ni ova ekipa nije mjerodavna ni u kakvom smislu. samo vam ukazujem na nebuloze i zablude o kojima svakodnevno raspredate. dakle ne bi bio dio te vase tzv. ekipe ni za dobre pare...   

te pare ni nemas pa nema frke.
ja tvoju ekipu nalazim tu kod mosta. za 5-10 dolara ce da nose dzakove, kopaju gde treba, ruse zidove... vec sta treba.
posteno rade ali nikoga ne interesuje sta misle. jer da misle uglavnom nisu savladali.

zato se toliko srdis zbog mene tzv. fizilalca i kamiomdzije. drzi se recepta za krofne, tu mozda i uspijes da sam sebi potvrdis da nesto vrijedis... za ostalo nisam siguran.    :)

Or, I could have been Joe Jett (another case of magna negligentia):


Derivatives Strategy, May 1999.

Joseph Jett's Phantom Bets
By Peter Vinella

Joseph Jett should be in jail. If not for securities fraud, then at least for writing this book. In a word, it is an embarrassment.

When I was first approached about reviewing Black and White on Wall Street (William Morrow, $25), my assignment was to determine how, over several years, he apparently lost $350 million without anybody knowing about it. This seemed simple enough. I had heard him describe his trades last year at a Derivatives Strategy conference and, at that time, it appeared that he was simply long the market when it tanked in 1994. No phantom trades, just normal off-balance-sheet contingent claims that went against him. I thought I would only have to skim through the book to the section that described his trades, then analyze his positions and confirm my first impressions.

I was wrong.

The book turned out to be a rambling statement of trading ignorance, blind racism and unfailing ego. It is both a 367-page testimony to one man's attempt to exploit his 15 minutes of fame and a shameless attempt to explain away a crime through bombastic self-aggrandizement. Those with even the slightest trading background will find themselves torn between laughing at the sheer stupidity of the book and becoming angry that anything this ridiculous should get any attention whatsoever. Simply put, Black and White on Wall Street is the Beyond the Valley of the Dolls of business literature. One only hopes it doesn't get the same cult following.

It's also clear to me that Jett didn't write the book—he merely recited it. The book is a collection of transcribed narrations. The rhythm is spoken rather than written. Thoughts and ideas begin focused and then trail off into nothingness. Chapters skip back and forth in time with few clues and entire phrases and passages often repeated.

But style and literary quality aside, I find Black and White on Wall Street offensive. It insults the reader's intelligence by draping a rather small and petty act, notable only for its size, in the guise of cheap sex, racism and sensationalism. Jett credits only himself for his successes and blames his race and the racism of others for his failures. His tone is so arrogant and so conceited that it is truly difficult to read the book.

My biggest objection to the book, however, is more personal. He incorrectly and obscenely describes a world I know all too well. I went to the same restaurants, lived in the same neighborhoods and went to the same clubs. (I was in Nell's nearly every night for three years and, although I was looking pretty hard, never saw any bare-breasted women or sex on the sofas.) I also put on some of the same trades as Jett, yet his world is alien and repugnant to me.

Trading Errors

As for Jett the trader, he is laughable. Throughout the book, he pontificates on his economic prowess, his quantitative skills, his knowledge of the ins-and-outs of the business, and his street savvy. Yet for all the effort, he comes off as a complete buffoon.

The book would be unbelievably boring if it weren't for the preposterous ideas and wild inaccuracies that litter nearly every page. For example, he goes to great lengths to describe why he believed the market would rally when the Treasury Department went from quarterly to semi-annual auctions. His logic: the shortage of securities would create upward price pressure while the infinite supply of futures would cheapen their price. At another point, he explains that his boss, Mel Mullin, disliked the high risks associated with arbitrage. But after reading the description of one of his "arbs"—a 10-year/two-year curve trade—I understood Mullin's hesitancy. In Jett's world, futures must be borrowed to cover short futures positions, and using balance-sheet capital is the same as spending money. For Jett's sake, I hope this was just a case of his laziness in proofreading the book. He can't really be that ignorant about the market.

Jett didn't lose $350 million in the market—he merely booked $350 million in trading profits he never actually made.

Contrary to my initial belief, I learned that Jett didn't lose $350 million in the market—he merely booked $350 million in trading profits he never actually made. How was Jett allowed to place these phantom trades, generate profits on them and have them go undetected for so long?

From 1992 through 1994, the Treasury bond went from nearly 8 percent to 6 percent and back to 8 percent. Since Treasury strips rally in bull markets and tank in bear markets, one could have assumed that Jett was long the whole roller coaster—a hero on the way up and a goat on way the down. What becomes clear in the book, however, is that Jett wasn't really trading at all. His alleged profits were nothing more than the result of weak systems and accounting procedures, just as General Electric, Kidder's parent company, claimed.

Jett attributes his trading profit to reconstitution trades, although no such kind of trade actually exists. He argues, correctly, that in order to reconstitute a series of strips, they must be delivered to the Fed, which in turn returns a bond. Jett even mentions that there is no profit-and-loss associated with this reconstitution. To get the strips off his internal Kidder systems and to get the bond in, however, he had to enter buy and sell tickets even though no actual trades took place. This was simply a way to delete the strip positions and entry the bond. There was no actual settlement.

In Jett's opinion, however, the delivery of the strips to the Fed and the subsequent receipt of the bond constitute actual trades with the Fed as the counterparty. Jett further compounds this farce by creating a new term—"time value." He says he discovered that while holding a bond for a three-month forward sale, he could earn this unexpected time value on top of the capital gains. Most readers will recognize this as simply accrued interest. In normal practice, the price for all forward-settling bond trades must be adjusted by the accrued interest, since the price of the bond is the sum of the net present value of the remaining cash flows.

The important point here is that Jett didn't have to concern himself with any of this, since no actual counterparty existed. In fact, on Page 288 of the book, Jett describes a discussion with Mullin in which Mullin explicitly points out this fact. Jett's response is remarkable. He argues that a forward reconstitution created a short position in the strips whose negative accretion (carry) would offset the accrued interest of the bond. But what short position is he talking about?

Kidder's deficient front-office system erroneously showed a forward risk position. But since there was no actual forward trade and therefore no associated market risk, he could simply buy strips at the market price for same-day settlement, deliver them to the Fed for reconstitution, receive the bond and sell the bond that day in the market. Hence, there was no negative accretion because there was no need to hedge. Whatever trading P&L occurred during the reconstitution could be hedged with futures and would, in any case, be dominated by the phantom positive carry of the long bond position—the bigger the position, the bigger the phantom accrued interest.

Joe Jett didn't lose any money. He never made it in the first place. He was paid a substantial bonus based on phantom profits generated strictly from operational and technological deficiencies. It is quite clear from the book that Jett knew what he was doing. The big question is, How many other people knew?

Clearly, anybody who wanted to know could have easily found out with a little due diligence. It is marginally conceivable that by looking only at the back-office and trading system reports, some managers could have seen reasonable activity and positive P&L, and guessed that nothing was irregular. But given Jett's inexperience, the market roller coaster that everybody was riding at the time and the size of profits, any competent manager should have known that somebody was cooking the books. I guess there was just too little incentive, given the fact that other bonuses were heavily dependent on Jett's phantom profits as well.

Jett was not a "big swinging dick," as he calls himself. He merely took advantage of poor systems and even poorer oversight. Considering the effects of his actions on Kidder, it is sad that Jett is still fighting to defend himself when he basically admits his own guilt in print. Maybe he believed that if he wrote his book badly enough, he'd be able to make his money back interpreting it on his lecture tour before anybody figured things out.