Arapsko prolece (ili zima)

[Tromotorac]

Jel' gledate sta se ovo desava u Tunisu, Egiptu, Jemenu i ostalim arapskim drzavama?

Izgleda da je u Egiptu u toku njihova verzija 9. marta sa tenkovima na ulicama, vodenim topovima, kucnim pritvorom i ostalim folklorom.

[zagor te nej]

Aha, Muslim Brotherhood sve trlja ruke. Pobednici na slobodnim izborima u arapskim zemljama su veoma slicni Hamasu u gazi. Beware what you wish for...

[Tromotorac]

Speaking of wishing... jesi li primetio da ova "smart diplomacy" super funkcionise? Hilari kad god nesto izjavi, ugazi u govno. A Obama sve cesce zvuci kao Bush.

[Tromotorac]

Breaking:

Egyptian military deploys on the streets of Cairo for first time in crisis as the country's ruling party headquarters is burning. Thousands of anti-government protesters clashed with hundreds of riot police

[zagor te nej]

A sta da kazu o Egiptu, kad je gubavi Hosni Mubarak jedini saveznik kog imaju u regionu? I kad znaju ko ce da ga nasledi? Manijaci, u najvecoj arapskoj zemlji na svetu? BTW, Al Zavahiri je originalni muslimanski brat. Pa ti vidi.
Hosni je gotov. Jedina brana braci na vlasti je vojno i policijsko kooptiranje revolucije.I cenim da sluzbe na tome rade vec danima.

[Pijanista]

Sayyid Qutb je Egipcanin.

[Tromotorac]

President Obama Speech to Muslim World in Cairo

[zagor te nej]

Govor je bio sasvim u redu. Steta sto je prethodila invazija na Irak koja je svakog muslimana na svetu ubedila u to da im je Amerika najveci neprijatelj na kugli zemaljskoj i dala krila svakom fundamentalistickom pokretu na planeti.

[Tromotorac]

Hmm, onda ti verovatno ti se verovatno dopada i nova misija NASA-e.

[zagor te nej]

ne obracam nesto paznju na Nasu u poslednje vreme, vise me zanimaju ovozemaljski problemi ;)

[Daisy]

evo tabele:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_longest_ruling_non-royal_leaders

iz arapskog regiona ovi su u vrhu:

1. Libija (41 god. +)
2. Jemen 32
3. Egipat 29
4. Sudan 21
...

Alžirac ima bednih 11 god.
Tunižanin je gazdovao 23 g.

ako dođe do nekih promena, najverovatnije je u pitanju Kurta-Murta promena

sumnjam da će neki od novih sprovesti bitnije sistemske promene

[Tromotorac]

A skeptic's guide to President Obama's Cairo speech

Talk to Al Jazeera - Charles Bolden





http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/07/07/nasas_muslim_outreach_106214.html

[zagor te nej]

Nasa nece imati para za kredu uskoro, ali za skole po Iraku i Avganistanu i boce koka kole od 25 dolara za one nesretenike u uniformi ima da pozajmljujemo jos ihahaj.

[zagor te nej]

Koji je ovo genije zakljucio da je Egipat bio pod stranom kontrolom 50 godina? Neki akademik sa univerziteteta Glen Beck?

[Tromotorac]

Oxidental college!

[zagor te nej]

ne radi mi youtube, ali to je najveca besmislica koju sam skoro cuo. Njima su vladali svio od Rimljana, preko Persijanaca, Turaka, Francuza do Engleza.

[Tromotorac]

http://occidentalsoapbox.blogspot.com/2009/06/skeptics-guide-to-president-obamas.html

Izgleda da nije college, ali svejedno. Eto ti propratni tekst.

[zagor te nej]

ma ko god da je, ta tvrdnja je sasvim besmislena. Onako, kako god okrenes.

[Tromotorac]

Pogledaj onaj tekst sa real clear politics. Govor je bio pun istorijskih izmisljotina, ali sto je najvise obraca se arapskom/islamskom svetu kroz african-american grievance prizmu.

Nije arapski svet zrtva Evropskih/Americke imperije, nego je zrtva sopstvenih diktatora i vertikalne drustvene korupcije. Ista prica kao sa Srbijom.

[zagor te nej]

Pa nesto se ne bih slozio da zapdna potreba za naftom nije istorijski odrzavala na vlasti bukvalno nenormalne drustvene sisteme zarad licnih interesa, bez obzira na stanje ljudskih prava u drzavama izvoznicama.
Srbija je rupcaga bez icega, sa sto kila zita. Egipat ima Suec, Arabija naftu, Iran bez americkih intervencija u pedesetim i odrzavanja na vlasti kleptomana Reze verovatno nikad ne bi imao islamsku revoluciju. Ona tvrdnja da svaki narod ima vlast kakvu zasluzuje stoji samo ako ta ista vlast ne zatvara na 30 godina bez sudjenja, cupa nokte, kamenuje na smrt, dok generacije i generacije  prodavaca demokratije gledaju na drugu stranu.Lokalne populacije nisu glupe kao sto se misli, i vrlo dobro znaju da je cutanje fakticko podrzavanje.

[Tromotorac]

Sta se desava kad se WikiLeaks popisa na liberal-DEM vlast u USA?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/8289686/Egypt-protests-Americas-secret-backing-for-rebel-leaders-behind-uprising.html

[Tromotorac]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012803144.html?hpid=topnews

xyxy

[Pareski do]

A sta da kazu o Egiptu, kad je gubavi Hosni Mubarak jedini saveznik kog imaju u regionu? I kad znaju ko ce da ga nasledi? Manijaci, u najvecoj arapskoj zemlji na svetu? BTW, Al Zavahiri je originalni muslimanski brat. Pa ti vidi.
Hosni je gotov. Jedina brana braci na vlasti je vojno i policijsko kooptiranje revolucije.I cenim da sluzbe na tome rade vec danima.

Хосни се држи и не бих га баш отписао. Распустио Владу и извео (народну) Армију на улице. 9. март се полако претвара у 1968. Није Тито крив него људи око њега...

Уосталом, Хосни јесте Војска (бивши начелник РВ) баш као што Египтом већ 60 година влада хунта у краватама од Насера, Нагиба, Садата и осталих пуковника и генерала из друштва часних официра или како се оно зваше?

Египатску архитектуру власти су градили СИП (Никезић итд.) по моделу војне службе док је Тунис више по ОЗНА/УДБ линији. Гадафи је Тито. Не знам шта су из југословенског тоталитаризма покупили Алжирци, видећемо када тамо запљушти ко је последња линија отпора...

[Paramecijum]

Alžir je već odradio svoja krvava proleća...

[Tromotorac]

Alzir nije imao mnogo veza sa SFRJ; oni su bili i ostali pod francuskim uticajem.

[Tromotorac]

Nisam siguran da li ovo ima ikakve veze sa Arapskom zimom/prolecem, ali svejedno evo vesti:

http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/anti-government-protest-in-albania/story-fn6s850w-1225996491961

[Hate mail]

Authoritarian governments start stockpiling food to fight public anger

Authoritarian governments across the world are aggressively stockpiling food as a buffer against soaring food costs which they fear may stoke popular discontent.

Commodities traders have warned they are seeing the first signs of panic buying from states concerned about the political implications of rising prices for staple crops.

Governments in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa have recently made large food purchases on the open market in the wake of unrest in Tunisia which deposed president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/8288555/Authoritarian-governments-start-stockpiling-food-to-fight-public-anger.html

[Pareski do]

Alzir nije imao mnogo veza sa SFRJ

I strongly disagree...

[Tromotorac]

http://pajamasmedia.com/victordavishanson/whats-the-matter-with-egypt/?singlepage=true

What's the Matter with Egypt?
January 30, 2011 - by Victor Davis Hanson Share |

So what's the matter with Egypt? The same thing that is the matter with most of the modern Middle East: in the post-industrial world, its hundreds of millions now are vicariously exposed to the affluence and freedom of the West via satellite television, cell phones, the Internet, DVDs, and social networks.

And they become angry that, in contrast to what they see and hear from abroad, their own lives are unusually miserable in the most elemental sense. Of course, there is no introspective Socrates on hand and walking about to remind the Cairo or Amman Street that their corrupt government is in some part a reification of themselves, who in their daily lives see the world in terms of gender apartheid, tribalism, religious intolerance, conspiracies, fundamentalism, and statism that are incompatible with a modern, successful, capitalist democracy.

That is, a century after the onset of modern waste treatment science, many of the cities in the Middle East smell of raw sewage. A century after we learned about microbes and disease, the water in places like Cairo is undrinkable from the tap. Six decades after the knowledge of treating infectious disease, millions in the Middle East suffer chronic pain and suffer from maladies that are easily addressed in the West. And they have about as much freedom as the Chinese, but without either the affluence or the confidence. That the Gulf and parts of North Africa are awash in oil and gas, at a time of both near record prices and indigenous control of national oil treasures, makes the ensuing poverty all the more insulting.

The Old Two-Step

All this has been true for forty years, but, again, instant global communications have brought the reality home to the miserable of the Middle East in a way state-run newspapers and state-censored television never could even had they wished.

In reaction, amid this volatile new communications revolution, the Saddams, the Mubaraks, the Saudi royals, the North African strongmen, and all the other "kings" and "fathers" and "leaders" found an effective enough antidote: The Jews were behind all sorts of plots to emasculate Arab Muslims. And the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain were stealing precious resources that robbed proud Middle Easterners of their heritage and future. Better yet, there was always a Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Oliver Stone, or, for the more high-brow, a Jimmy Carter to offer a useful exegesis of American conspiracy, oil-mongery, or Zionist infiltration into the West Wing that "proved" Middle East misery was most certainly not self-induced.

We know the old Middle East two-step that then followed the party line. A Gaddafi or Saddam or a Saudi prince on the sly turned a blind eye to jihadists, or funded them, or in some ways subsidized them — on the condition that they embodied popular outrage but diverted it from Middle Eastern authoritarians to Americans and Israelis. The more "friendly" and "pro-Western" (and the Saudis and the Pakistanis were the past masters at this) would then come to us, deplore terrorism, promise to crack down on it, but also insist that their own thugocracies and kleptocracies were the only fingers in the dike that held back the flood of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Iranian-like theocracy, etc.. Ergo, we were to give money or support or both to those that two-timed us, on the premise that the alternative was surely worse.

And the Response is?

I think the American response was usually over the decades twofold: One, we were to sigh, "Well, Mubarak's an SOB but he at least is ours and not sending out terrorists to blow up Americans in Lebanon or Saudi Arabia, and he keeps the peace with Israel." Two, we were to talk grandly of a meaningless West Bank "peace process." Since our friendly dictators were terrified of their own, they simultaneously winked at terrorists who went after us rather than them, and blamed Israel for the "tension" in the Middle East (yes, the Jews should be behind the corrupt officials who tried to shake down a poor Tunisian one too many times, driving him to self-conflagration — and the ensuing wildfire into the Middle East). The more we promised to pressure Israel, the more we could ignore the misery of Cairo, and the more a thieving Mubarak could perpetuate it.

Pre-Bush Republican realists usually allowed all this in service to "national security," as in no repeat of the fall of the shah, or the 1970s oil embargoes, or the near disastrous Yom Kippur War and tardy American logistical effort. Democrats did the above as often, but more cleverly added a multicultural, relativist twist of "who are we to judge other systems and cultures when our own is at fault as well (fill in the race, class, gender blanks)?" No one seemed to wish an Eisenhower 1956 Suez solution of rebuking our allies, standing up for principle — and thereby aiding the likes of Nasser and the USSR, while alienating and humiliating our European friends (unforgotten to this day) and Israel.

The New Realities

So what is the matter with Egypt? Why cannot the above mess just keep on keeping on? A number of newer twists.

1) We are not so sure that Mubarak's "it is us or the jihadists" is quite operative any more, given the defeat of jihadists in Iraq and the downward spiral in approval of bin Laden. In any case, there seems no Khomeini-like figure on the horizon in the radical Islamist Arab world. And to be one, there would have to be, as in Khomeini's case in France, lots of Western appeasement and subsidies. After 9/11, not even a France wishes to embrace an Islamist and create another Khomeini. The result is that when Mubarak and Co. threaten us with the Muslim Brotherhood, we are not quite convinced, as in the past, that it will hijack the street as Khomeini once did. Thus in the last week we have gone from Biden's Mubarak "not a dictator" to an "evolving," finger-in-the-wind stance — in hopes that the Shah-Banisadr-Khomeini formula is not inevitable (yet in this regard, remember that 160,000 U.S. troops played quite a role in stopping the Iraq possible cycle of Saddam-Allawi-Zarqawi).

2) Iraq changed things, and in subtle and as of yet not easily fathomable fashion. When Reagan shouted at the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union most surely did not come down for four years. But when it did, in hindsight we can see that such symbolic confrontations, along with the military challenges, insidiously exposed and weakened the corrupt system. When Saddam was routed (had a Middle Eastern thug ever been put on trial?), and the insurrection mostly crushed, and a consensual government in power in Baghdad survived for seven years amid the most unlikely chances for survival, then the Middle East (as the Saudis rightly knew and double-dealed as a result) was not quite the same.

Iran is desperate to strangle a free Iraq, since its nearby free media has a tendency to encourage things like the 2009 uprising across the border. Yet to suggest that Bush unleashed in 2003 a revolutionary chain of events is heretical. In our twisted political calculus, Bush is demonic for speaking out for human rights and removing Saddam, Obama is progressive for ignoring human rights protestors in the streets of Khomeinist Iran.

3) I don't particularly like Mubarak and will be glad to see him leave, but please spare us the condemnation that we "made" him. We did not. He is a reflection of the pathologies that were outlined above, and would have to be invented had he not existed. He could not have come to power without an underlining culture of tribalism, gender apartheid, religious intolerance, and statism. And he has less blood on his hands than did the once beloved "authentic" Nasser (whose use of poison gas in Yemen provided the revolutionary model for Saddam in Kurdistan and at the time bothered no one in Nasserite Egypt).

4) What's next? "Finger-in-the-wind" diplomacy may work for a while, but it requires deftness that follows conditions on the street in a nanosecond to avoid appearing purely cynical (a skill beyond Hillary, Biden, and Obama). I think in this bad/worse choice scenario we might as well support supposedly democratic reformers, with the expectation that they could either fail in removing Mubarak or be nudged out by those far worse than Mubarak. Contrary to popular opinion, I think Bush was right to support elections in Gaza "one time" (only of course). The Gazans got what they wanted, we are done with them, and they have to live with the results, happy in their thuggish misery, with a prosperous Israel and better-off West Bank to remind them of their stupidity. All bad, but an honest bad and preferable to the lie that there were thousands of Jeffersonians in Gaza thwarted by the U.S.

So step back and watch it play out with encouragement for those who oppose both Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood— hoping for the best, expecting the worst.

[Tromotorac]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/28/AR2011012806833.html

In the streets of Cairo, proof Bush was right
Elliott Abrams
Sunday, January 30, 2011; B01



Bush adviser says Obama should have listened to the former president


For decades, the Arab states have seemed exceptions to the laws of politics and human nature. While liberty expanded in many parts of the globe, these nations were left behind, their "freedom deficit" signaling the political underdevelopment that accompanied many other economic and social maladies. In November 2003, President George W. Bush asked these questions:

"Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom and never even to have a choice in the matter?"

The massive and violent demonstrations underway in Egypt, the smaller ones in Jordan and Yemen, and the recent revolt in Tunisia that inspired those events have affirmed that the answer is no and are exploding, once and for all, the myth of Arab exceptionalism. Arab nations, too, yearn to throw off the secret police, to read a newspaper that the Ministry of Information has not censored and to vote in free elections. The Arab world may not be swept with a broad wave of revolts now, but neither will it soon forget this moment.

So a new set of questions becomes critical. What lesson will Arab regimes learn? Will they undertake the steady reforms that may bring peaceful change, or will they conclude that exiled Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali erred only by failing to shoot and club enough demonstrators? And will our own government learn that dictatorships are never truly stable? For beneath the calm surface enforced by myriad security forces, the pressure for change only grows - and it may grow in extreme and violent forms when real debate and political competition are denied.

The regimes of Ben Ali and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak proffered the same line to Washington: It's us or the Islamists. For Tunisia, a largely secular nation with a literacy rate of 75 percent and per capita GDP of $9,500, this claim was never defensible. In fact, Ben Ali jailed moderates, human rights advocates, editors - anyone who represented what might be called "hope and change."

Mubarak took the same tack for three decades. Ruling under an endless emergency law, he has crushed the moderate opposition while the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood has thrived underground and in the mosques. Mubarak in effect created a two-party system - his ruling National Democratic Party and the Brotherhood - and then defended the lack of democracy by saying a free election would bring the Islamists to power.

Of course, neither he nor we can know for sure what Egyptians really think; last fall's parliamentary election was even more corrupt than the one in 2005. And sometimes the results of a first free election will find the moderates so poorly organized that extreme groups can eke out a victory, as Hamas did when it gained a 44-to-41 percent margin in the Palestinian election of 2006. But we do know for sure that regimes that make moderate politics impossible make extremism far more likely. Rule by emergency decree long enough, and you end up creating a genuine emergency. And Egypt has one now.

"Angry Friday" brought tens of thousands of Egyptians into the streets all over the country, and they have remained there all weekend, demanding the end of the Mubarak regime. The huge and once-feared police forces were soon overwhelmed and the Army called in. Even if these demonstrations are crushed, Egypt has a president who will be 83 at the time of this fall's presidential election. Every day Hosni Mubarak survives in power now, he does so as dictator propped up by brute force alone. Election of his son Gamal as his successor is already a sour joke, and it is increasingly unlikely that Egypt's ruling elites, civilian and military, will wish to tie their future to Hosni Mubarak rather than seeking new faces.

Mubarak's appointment on Saturday of Egypt's intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as vice president and of former air force commander Ahmed Shafiq as prime minister suggests that Mubarak knows his own future is much in doubt. It also suggests that the military is already in full control of the country and preparing for the post-Mubarak period. If Suleiman and Shafiq have the full support of the Army and would promise a free election in the fall, perhaps the crowds would accept them as transitional figures once Mubarak resigns. But it may be too late for Mubarak to hand-pick his closest aides to run Egypt if he is forced out.

The three decades Hosni Mubarak and his cronies have already had in power leave Egypt with no reliable mechanisms for a transition to democratic rule. Egypt will have some of the same problems as Tunisia, where there are no strong democratic parties and where the demands of the people for rapid change may outstrip the new government's ability to achieve it. This is also certain to be true in Yemen, where a weak central government has spent all its energies and most of its resources simply staying in power.

All these developments seem to come as a surprise to the Obama administration, which dismissed Bush's "freedom agenda" as overly ideological and meant essentially to defend the invasion of Iraq. But as Bush's support for the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon and for a democratic Palestinian state showed, he was defending self-government, not the use of force. Consider what Bush said in that 2003 speech, which marked the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, an institution established by President Ronald Reagan precisely to support the expansion of freedom.

"Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe - because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty," Bush said. "As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export."

This spirit did not always animate U.S. diplomacy in the Bush administration; plenty of officials found it unrealistic and had to be prodded or overruled to follow the president's lead. But the revolt in Tunisia, the gigantic wave of demonstrations in Egypt and the more recent marches in Yemen all make clear that Bush had it right - and that the Obama administration's abandonment of this mind-set is nothing short of a tragedy.

U.S. officials talked to Mubarak plenty in 2009 and 2010, and even talked to the far more repressive President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, but they talked about their goals for Israeli-Palestinian peace and ignored the police states outside the doors of those presidential palaces. When the Iranian regime stole the June 2009 elections and people went to the streets, the Obama administration feared that speaking out in their support might jeopardize the nuclear negotiations. The "reset" sought with Russia has been with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, not the Russian people suffering his increasingly despotic and lawless rule.

This has been the greatest failure of policy and imagination in the administration's approach: Looking at the world map, it sees states and their rulers, but has forgotten the millions of people suffering under and beginning to rebel against those rulers. "Engagement" has not been the problem, but rather the administration's insistence on engaging with regimes rather than with the people trying to survive under them.

If the Arab regimes learn the wrong lessons and turn once again to their police and their armies, the U.S. reaction becomes even more important. President Obama's words of support for both the demonstrators and the government late Friday, after speaking with Mubarak, were too little, too late. He said Mubarak had called for "a better democracy" in Egypt, but Obama's remarks did not clearly demand democracy or free elections there. We cannot deliver democracy to the Arab states, but we can make our principles and our policies clear. Now is the time to say that the peoples of the Middle East are not "beyond the reach of liberty" and that we will assist any peaceful effort to achieve it - and oppose and condemn efforts to suppress it.

Such a statement would not elevate our ideals at the expense of our interests. It turns out, as those demonstrators are telling us, that supporting freedom is the best policy of all.

[Jelence]

Nemoj mi Arape... Kad god sam imala posla sa njima, uvek sam se zajebala.

Svaki jebeni put.

Zadnja rana je prilicno sveza, kad sam "prijatelju" ucinila uslugu. Jebiga, tako mi i treba. Rodjene su kurve, one najjeftinije. Prodali bi dusu za $2. A mole se 5 puta dnevno. Kom se kurcu mole???

Tako da mi puca djoka za bilo sta u vezi Arapa. Nek se pobiju il nek se razmnozavaju. Jebe mi se.

[Tromotorac]

A dok te nije taj zajebao, bili su ti super, i sad ti odjednom ne valjaju. How sad.

[Jelence]

Na osnovu cega si to zakljucio?

[E]

Na osnovu cega si to zakljucio?

Ma provocira te  :mrgreen:

[zagor te nej]

Ma da, onaj debakl u Iraku je svakako doveo do promene vlasti u Egiptu ili Tunisu. Please  :roll:  A tek cemo da vidimo sta se u stvari promenilo, i da li ce se ista promeniti, i ko, u ne preterano mogucem scenariju da Egipat ima prave demokratske otvorene izbore na njima moze da dodje na vlast. Beware what you wish for, sto bi rekli.

Ako je proteklih par nedelja nesto dokazalo, to su dve stvari: na ranjivost sistema u totalitarnoim drustvu mnogo vise uticaja ima social media nego sve zapadne obavestajne sluzbe i celokupna vojna sila, i drugo, najbolje je ne mesati se mnogo, jer si toliko nepopularan u tom svetu da stavljanjem na neciju stranu direktno slabis poziciju ononga koga preferirash.

[slawen]

Ја сам много добар у овим стварима: ценим да је Мубарак жртвован (а ствари ће свеједно остати исте у погледу америчких интереса & утицаја тамо) да би се "талас спонтаних протеста" прелио у Иран.

[Pijanista]

Kad ce Gadafi....

[slawen]

... д'умре?

[Pijanista]

Bilo sta. Umre, nestane, zatrazi azil u CG...

[Tromotorac]

Ја сам много добар у овим стварима: ценим да је Мубарак жртвован (а ствари ће свеједно остати исте у погледу америчких интереса & утицаја тамо) да би се "талас спонтаних протеста" прелио у Иран.

Kamo lepe srece da je tako.

To sto se desava u Iranu ja vidim kao paralelu onog sto se desavalo pod Slobom. Videli Srbi da su ostali zbacili komuniste s' vlasti, pa probaju i oni. Al' oces q., Sloba bio faktor stabilnosti, (dok nije prestao to da bude).

[Tromotorac]

Ma da, onaj debakl u Iraku je svakako doveo do promene vlasti u Egiptu ili Tunisu. Please  :roll:  A tek cemo da vidimo sta se u stvari promenilo, i da li ce se ista promeniti, i ko, u ne preterano mogucem scenariju da Egipat ima prave demokratske otvorene izbore na njima moze da dodje na vlast. Beware what you wish for, sto bi rekli.

Ako je proteklih par nedelja nesto dokazalo, to su dve stvari: na ranjivost sistema u totalitarnoim drustvu mnogo vise uticaja ima social media nego sve zapadne obavestajne sluzbe i celokupna vojna sila, i drugo, najbolje je ne mesati se mnogo, jer si toliko nepopularan u tom svetu da stavljanjem na neciju stranu direktno slabis poziciju ononga koga preferirash.

Fine with me.

Naravoucenije - stop trying to be liked/popular. Do what is in your interest.

[Hate mail]

Like Interest Rate Swaps. :mrgreen:

[slawen]

Јел' то нема везе са оним пројектованим УСА дефицитом од 140% БНП?
Јеботе, где сам ја то пош'о....